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INFO INTERVENTION
By Heyang Gong and Ke Zhu∗
University of Science and Technology of China & University of Hong Kong
Causal diagrams based on do intervention are useful tools to
formalize, process and understand causal relationship among vari-
ables. However, the do intervention has controversial interpretation
of causal questions for non-manipulable variables, and it also lacks
the power to check the conditions related to counterfactual variables.
This paper introduces a new info intervention to tackle these two
problems, and provides causal diagrams for communication and the-
oretical focus based on this info intervention. Our info intervention
intervenes the input/output information of causal mechanisms, while
the do intervention intervenes the causal mechanisms. Consequently,
the causality is viewed as information transfer in the info interven-
tion framework. As an extension, the generalized info intervention is
also proposed and studied in this paper.
1. Introduction. Since the seminal work of Pearl (1995), the causal
diagrams based on do intervention have been an important tool for causal
inference. Pearl’s causal diagrams provide not only a formal language for
communicating causal questions but also an effective way for identifying
causal effects. These merits of causal diagrams have stimulated applications
in many fields; see, e.g., Greenland, Pearl and Robins (1999), White and
Lu (2011), Meinshausen et al. (2016), Williams et al. (2018), and Huner-
mund and Bareinboim (2019) among others. In the era of big data and AI,
three fundamental obstacles are standing in our way to strong AI, includ-
ing robustness (or adaptability), explainability and lacking of understand-
ing cause-effect connections (Pearl, 2019a), and the hard open problems
of machine learning are intrinsically related to causality (Scho¨lkopf, 2019).
Encouragingly, Pearl (2019a) asserted that all these obstacles can be over-
come using causal modeling tools, in particular, causal diagrams and their
associated logic.
Pearl’s causal diagrams based on do intervention are mainly manipulated
in the causal directed acyclic graph (DAG), under which Markov factoriza-
tion is assumed for the joint distribution of all variables, giving rise a way to
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calculate the intervention distribution in do-intervention DAG. In a causal
DAG, Pearl’s diagrams can identify the causal effects by using observational
probabilities under several conditions (e.g., “back-door”/“front-door” cri-
teria and Pearl’s three rules), which could largely demystify the haunting
“confounding” problem in applications. Although the do intervention pro-
vides an effective way for causal inference, criticisms of this operator still
exist. One is that the empirical interpretation of do intervention is contro-
versial when applied to non-manipulable variables such as age, race, obesity,
or cholesterol level (Pearl, 2019b). Another one is that the counterfactual
variables (also known as the potential outcome variables) are not included
on causal diagrams, and so the conditions related to counterfactual variables
(e.g., the conditional independence and “ignorability” conditions) can not
be directly read off the graph (Herna´n and Robins, 2019).
In this paper, we first introduce a new info intervention for the structural
causal model (SCM), which nests the DAG as a special case. Let X be
the intervention variable in SCM. Our info intervention operator σ(X = x˜)
sends out the information X = x˜ to the descendant nodes of X, while
keeping the rest of the model intact. Since the information X = x˜ has
been received by its descendant nodes, the edges as communication channels
from X to its child nodes are removed after info intervention. In other
words, the info intervention replaces X by x˜ in the structural equations
of child nodes of X, and then updates the input of structural equations
at other descendant nodes of X accordingly. Consequently, the variables at
descendant nodes of X become counterfactual variables, and they have no
causal effect from X in the info-intervention SCM. This is different from
Pearl’s do intervention operator do(X = x˜), under which the value of X
is forced to be a hypothetical value x˜, and the edges of X from its parent
nodes are removed, while keeping the rest of the model intact. Owing to
this difference, the causal questions on non-manipulable variables are not
controversial for the info intervention, because the info intervention keeps
the mechanisms of X, and changes the variables at descendant nodes of X
to counterfactual variables with the transferred information X = x˜; at the
same time, since the counterfactual variables exist in the info-intervention
SCM, some conditions on counterfactual variables could be directly read off
the graph in many circumstances.
Next, we present a new info-causal DAG based on info intervention. Our
info-causal DAG has the same graph for all considered variables as Pearl’s
causal DAG, and it also follows the causal DAG to assume Markov factor-
ization for the joint distribution of all variables. However, unlike the causal
DAG, the info-causal DAG specifies the intervention distribution differently.
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The first difference is that the intervention variables inheriting their pre-
intervention distributions are still random in info-intervention DAG, while
they become deterministic in do-intervention DAG. This difference is com-
patible to the fact that the info intervention keeps all causal mechanisms
as in “Law-like” causality framework, and the do intervention removes the
causal mechanisms of intervention variables. The second difference is that
the intervention distribution in info-intervention DAG is for a group of vari-
ables including either those from the info-causal DAG or the counterfactual
ones (i.e., the variables at descendant nodes of intervention variables), how-
ever, the intervention distribution in do-intervention DAG is always for all
variables from the causal DAG. This difference makes the info interven-
tion being capable to deal with counterfactual variables as in experimental
causality framework.
Due to the aforementioned two differences, our info-causal DAG could
have several advantages over Pearl’s causal DAG. First, the info-causal DAG
inherits the advantage of info intervention SCM to avoid the controversial
interpretation of the questions for non-manipulable variables and check the
conditions for counterfactual variables. Second, the info-causal DAG can
raise the interventional and counterfactual questions conditional on the in-
tervention variables, while the causal DAG can not. This advantage is partic-
ularly important when the intervention variables still have the causal effects
on its (part of) descendants after intervention. In this case, we can naturally
extend our info intervention idea to form a so-called generalized info-causal
DAG, however, this seems challenging in the do intervention framework.
Interestingly, compared with Pearl’s causal DAG, our info-causal DAG
not only exhibits the advantage in terms of communication, but also keeps
the capability in terms of theoretical focus. Specifically, we show that the
causal calculus under some conditions (e.g., “back-door”/“front-door” crite-
ria and three rules) shares the same formulations expressed by observational
probabilities in both DAGs. Although the causal calculus has no difference
in form, the underlying causality is essentially different in both DAGs. In the
info-causal DAG, we view the causality as information transform, meaning
that a variable X causes another variable Y iff “changing information on X
leads to a potential change in Y , while keeping everything else constant”.
In the causal DAG, the causality is viewed differently, saying that X causes
Y iff “changing X leads to a change in Y , while keeping everything else
constant”.
We shall mention that our info-causal DAG has certain similarities with
the single-world intervention graph (SWIG) in Richardson and Robins (2013).
The SWIG is an approach to unifying graphs and counterfactuals via split-
4 GONG AND ZHU
ting every intervention node into a random node and a fixed node. Although
both SWIG and info-causal DAG consider the counterfactual variables, they
have several differences. First, the info-intervention DAG does not contain
fixed nodes, leading to a more neat way for use than the SWIG. Second, the
intervention distribution in info-intervention DAG is determined by the joint
distribution in info-causal DAG, while that in SWIG is directly assumed.
Consequently, in terms of causal calculus, the SWIG needs additional mod-
ularity assumptions to link the conditional distribution of counterfactual
variables in intervention DAG to that of corresponding variables in obser-
vational DAG. Third, the systematic tools in terms of communication and
theoretical focus as Pearl’s causal DAG are present for the info-causal DAG
but absent for the SWIG. Fourth, the info-causal DAG is extended to the
generalized info-causal DAG, and this extension seems hard for the SWIG.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the
preliminaries on Pearl’s diagrams. Section 3 introduces our info interven-
tion. Section 4 presents our info-causal DAG. Section 5 provides the causal
calculus based on the info-causal DAG. An extension work on the gener-
alized info intervention is considered in Section 6. Concluding remarks are
offered in Section 7. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Preliminaries. The notation of causality has been much examined,
discussed and debated in science and philosophy over many centuries. Among
many proposed frameworks for causality, Pearl’s causal diagrams have been
widely used in the real world to formalize causal questions and implement
causal inferences for observational data. In this section, we mainly intro-
duce some preliminaries on Pearl’s causal diagrams, which are build on the
structural causal model (SCM) (also known as structural equation model)
to make graphical assumptions of the underlying data generating process
(see, e.g., Pearl (2009) and Forre´ and Mooij (2019) for overviews).
Definition 2.1 (SCM). An SCM by definition consists of:
1. A set of nodes V + = V ∪˙U , where elements of V correspond to en-
dogenous variables, elements of U correspond to exogenous (or latent)
variables, and V ∪˙U is the disjoint union of sets V and U .
2. An endogenous/exogenous space Xv for every v ∈ V
+, X :=
∏
v∈V + Xv.
3. A product probability measure P := PU = ⊗u∈UPu on the latent space∏
u∈U Xu.
4. A directed graph structure G+ = (V +, E+), with a set of directed edges
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E+ and a system of structural equations fV = (fv)v∈V :
fv :
∏
s∈pa(v)∩G+
Xs → Xv,
where ch(U) ∩ G+ ⊆ V , all functions fV are measurable, and ch(v)
and pa(v) stand for child and parent nodes of v in G+, respectively.
Conventionally, an SCM can be summarized by the tuple M = (G+,X , P, f).
Note that G+ is referred as the augmented functional graph, while the func-
tional graph which includes only endogenous variables, is denoted as G.
According to its definition, the SCM deploys three parts, including graphi-
cal models, structural equations, and counterfactual and interventional logic.
Graphical models serve as a language for representing what we know about
the world, counterfactuals help us to articulate what we want to know, while
structural equations serve to tie the two together in solid semantics.
Let XA be a set of variables at the nodes A. For any I ⊆ V , the key im-
plementation of Pearl’s causal diagrams is to capture interventions by using
an intervention operator called do(XI = x˜I), which simulates physical inter-
ventions by deleting certain functions from the model, replacing them with
a constant vector XI = x˜I , while keeping the rest of the model unchanged.
Formally, XI are called intervention variables, and this do intervention op-
erator on XI is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (do intervention). Given an SCM M = (G+,X , P, f)
for XV and any I ⊆ V , the do intervention do(XI = x˜I) (or, in short,
do(x˜I)) maps M to the do-intervention model M
do(x˜I ) = (G+,X , P, f˜ ) for
XV , where
f˜v(Xpa(v)∩V ,Xpa(v)∩U ) :=
{
x˜v, v ∈ I,
fv(Xpa(v)∩V ,Xpa(v)∩U ), v ∈ V \ I .
Since there has theoretical and technical complications in dealing with
the cyclic SCM, most of efforts are made to study the directed acyclic graph
(DAG) in the class of acyclic SCMs (Bongers et al., 2020). Generally speak-
ing, the DAG can be viewed as the non-parametric analogue of an acyclic
SCM. Denote a DAG by G = (V,E), with a set of nodes V and a set of di-
rected edges E. For ease of notation, we re-define X := XV as the variables
at V . To do causal inference in G, we need specify a way to calculate the
intervention distribution of X in the do-intervention DAG, and this leads to
the so-called causal DAG, under which the causal semantics could be well
defined without any complications.
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Definition 2.3 (Causal DAG). Consider a DAG G = (V,E) and a
random vector X with distribution P . Then, G is called a causal DAG for
X if P satisfies the following:
1. P factorizes, and thus is Markov, according to G, and
2. for any A ⊆ V , B = V/A, and any x˜A, xB in the domains of XA,XB,
(2.1) P (x|do(x˜A)) =
∏
k∈B
P (xk|xpa(k))
∏
j∈A
I(xj = x˜j).
In view of (2.1), the difference between the observational distribution
P (x) and the do-intervention distribution P (x|do(x˜A)) is that all factors
P (xj |xpa(j)), j ∈ A, are removed and replaced by degenerate probabilities
I(xj = x˜j), while all remaining factors P (xk|xpa(k)), k ∈ B, stay the same.
For a causal DAG G, its do-intervention DAG is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4 (do-intervention DAG). Consider a causal DAG G =
(V,E) for a random vector X, and its do intervention do(x˜A). Then, the do-
intervention DAG, denoted by Gdo(x˜A), is for X, which has the do-intervention
distribution P (x|do(x˜A)) in (2.1).
In a causal DAG, if P (xB |do(x˜A)) 6= P (xB |do(x˜
′
A)) for two values x˜A 6=
x˜′A, we say that XA has the causal effect on XB . Clearly, to draw the causal
inference, it is crucial to determine whether P (xB |do(x˜A)) can be calculated
by using the observational probabilities. Pearl (1995) raised the concept of
“identifiability” to answer this question.
Definition 2.5 (Identifiability). The causal effect of XA to XB is said
to be identifiable if the quantity P (xB |do(x˜A)) can be computed uniquely from
any positive distribution of the observed variables that is compatible with G.
To check the identifiability, Pearl (1995) gave “back-door”/“front-door”
criteria and three rules, which are widely used to deal with the “confound-
ing” problem, making the causal DAG attractive in plenty of applications.
Once the causal effect is identifiable, many quantities of interest (e.g., the
average causal effect (ACE) and the conditional ACE) can be calculated
accordingly.
Besides Pearl’s causal diagrams, many other DAGs or graphical models
can also be used to implement the causal inference. For more discussions and
developments in this context, we refer to Lauritzen and Richardson (2002),
Richardson and Spirtes (2002), Peters et al. (2016), Maathuis et al. (2018),
Rothenhausler, Bu¨hlmann and Meinshausen (2019), and references therein.
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3. Info intervention. Causal questions, such as what if we make some-
thing happen, can be formalized by using do intervention, which, however, is
still controversial on empirical understanding as mentioned by Pearl (2018,
2019b). In many settings, a do intervention which forces the variable to a
given value is somewhat idealized or hypothetical. For instance, it is contro-
versial to manipulate variables such as age, race, obesity, or cholesterol level
by setting their values to some hypothetical ones in do intervention. To see
this point more clearly, we consider the following example.
Example 3.1. Assume a causal relationship among 6 domain variables
in Fig 1. Suppose that we aim to study the causal effect of Age on Income
by using do intervention. However, the empirical interpretation of the in-
tervention do(Age = a˜) is controversial for a hypothetical positive integer
a˜, though Pearl suggested that we should interpret it in other dimensions
(Pearl, 2019b). In other words, it seems unreasonable to articulate a causal
question that what if Age equals a˜ under do intervention framework, indicat-
ing that the do intervention is not complete for formalizing real world causal
questions.
Occupation
Exercise
Income
Age
Diet
Cholesterol
Fig 1: A causal relationship
Although it is controversial to force or set Age to a hypothetical value a˜
in Example 3.1, it is always non-controversial to send out the information
that Age is a˜. This motivates us to consider new causal semantics based on
info intervention operator, whose formal definition is given below.
Definition 3.1 (Info intervention). Given an SCM M = (G+,X , P, f)
for XV and any I ⊆ V , the info intervention σ(XI = x˜I) (or, in short,
σ(x˜I)) maps M to the info-intervention model M
σ(x˜I ) = (G+,X , P, f) for
X
σ(x˜I )
V , where
Xσ(x˜I )v = fv(X˜V ∩pa(v),XU∩pa(v))
with X˜j = x˜j if j ∈ I else X
σ(x˜I )
j .
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Let desc(I) denote the descendant nodes of every node in I. Based on Def-
inition 3.1, we can show that for any node i 6∈ desc(A) with A ⊆ V ,X
σ(x˜A)
i =
Xi. Also, for two disjoint sets A,B ⊆ V , X
σ(x˜A,x˜B)
v :=
(
X
σ(x˜A)
v
)σ(x˜B) has
the commutative property, that is, X
σ(x˜A,x˜B)
v = X
σ(x˜B ,x˜A)
v for all v ∈ V .
Moreover, based on Definition 3.1, we know that the info-intervention
SCM Mσ(x˜I ) does not delete any structural equations fV from the model,
but just sends out the information XI = x˜I to desc(I). Since the information
XI = x˜I has been received by desc(I), the edges from I to ch(I) (i.e., the
child nodes of I) are removed inMσ(x˜I ), and the variables at desc(I) become
counterfactual variables with a hypothetical input XI = x˜I in their struc-
tural equations. Note that the counterfactual variables are also known as the
potential outcome variables, and they are unobservable variables that live
in the counterfactual world. For more discussions on the potential outcome
framework, we refer to Rubin (1974), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996),
Imbens and Rubin (2015), Imbens (2019) and references therein.
Compared with the do intervention do(x˜I), the info intervention σ(x˜I) has
two critical differences. First, Mσ(x˜I ) keeps the causal mechanisms (i.e., the
structural equations fV ) unchanged, whileM
do(x˜I ) does not. Second,Mσ(x˜I )
contains the counterfactual variables at desc(I), whileMdo(x˜I ) does not. The
first difference makes the info intervention have no non-manipulable vari-
ables problem, which, however, exists in the do intervention. For example,
we can articulate the causal question that what if Age equals a˜ in Example
3.1 by using σ(a˜) := σ(Age = a˜), since the descendant nodes of Age in
Mσ(a˜) do receive the hypothetical value Age = a˜, and at the same time, the
actual value of this intervention variable Age in Mσ(a˜) does not change. The
second difference could provide us a direct visual way to determine the con-
ditional independence between variables in M and counterfactual variables
in Mσ(x˜I ), however, this is hardly feasible in the do intervention frame-
work. Re-consider Example 3.1, in which we can easily use the d-separation
argument to show that given Occupation, Exerciseσ(a˜) and Incomeσ(a˜) are
independent. Clearly, this relationship can not be found by using the do
intervention.
To further illustrate how the info intervention works and what are the
differences between info and do interventions, we consider the following
example:
Example 3.2. An SCM M with a treatment T , an outcome Y , a con-
founder Z, and two latent variables ǫT , ǫZ is given in Fig 2(a), and its struc-
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T
ǫT
Z ǫZ
Y
(a) An SCM M .
T = t˜
Z
Y
ǫZ
ǫT
(b) Mdo(t˜).
T
Z
Y σ(t˜)
ǫZ
ǫT
(c) Mσ(t˜).
Fig 2: An SCM and its two intervention SCMs.
tural equations are: 
Z = fZ(ǫZ),
T = fT (Z, ǫT ),
Y = fY (T,Z).
Based on Definition 2.2, its do-intervention SCM Mdo(t˜) given in Fig 2(b)
has the following structural equations:
Z = fZ(ǫZ),
T = t˜,
Y = fY (T,Z).
Based on Definition 3.1, its info-intervention SCM Mσ(t˜) given in Fig 2(c)
has the following structural equations:
Z = fZ(ǫZ),
T = fT (Z, ǫT ),
Y σ(t˜) = fY (t˜, Z),
where we have used the fact that Zσ(t˜) = Z and T σ(t˜) = T . Note that the
causal mechanisms (i.e., fZ, fT and fY ) are unchanged only in M
σ(t˜), while
Y in M becomes a counterfactual variable Y σ(t˜) in Mσ(t˜). Moreover, from
Fig 2(c), the d-seperation argument (Geiger, Verma and Pearl, 1990) implies
that given Z, Y σ(t˜) and T are independent. That is, the ignorability condition
of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) can be directly read off Fig 2(c).
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In the do intervention framework, Pearl (2019a) raised the concept of
three-level causal hierarchy to articulate the causal questions into three lev-
els: 1. Association; 2. Intervention; 3. Counterfactuals. This classification of
causal questions gives us a useful insight on what kind of questions each
class is capable of answering, and questions at level i can be answered only
if information from level j (> i) is available. Similar to Pearl’s idea, we can
give a three-level causal hierarchy in the info intervention framework:
1. Association P (xB |xA) := P (XB = xB |XA = xA)
• Typical activity: Seeing.
• Typical questions: What is? How would seeing XA change my
belief in XB?
• Examples: What does the habit of exercise information tell me
about the cholesterol level? What does a symptom tell me about
a disease?
2. Intervention P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC) := P (X
σ(x˜A)
B = xB|X
σ(x˜A)
C = xC)
• Typical activity: Intervening.
• Typical questions: What if? What if I manipulate the information
sending out from XA?
• Examples: What will the income be if the company received the
information that my age is 32? What will happen if the public
received the information that the price is doubled?
3. Counterfactuals P (x
σ(x˜A)
B |xA, xB) := P (X
σ(x˜A)
B = x
σ(x˜A)
B |XA = xA,XB
= xB)
• Typical activity: Imagining, Retrospection.
• Typical questions: Why?Was it the information ofXA that caused
XB?
• Examples: Was it the information of young age caused me to have
low income? What if I had told the company the information my
age is 32 given that my actual age is 22?
Both Pearl’s and our three-level causal hierarchies can formulate kinds of
causal questions. One advantage of our three-level causal hierarchy is that
the causal questions for non-manipulable variables are not controversial.
This is due to the fact that the info intervention does not change the causal
mechanisms of the intervention variables, but just sends out the informa-
tion on the intervention to the model. To make this point more clearly, we
re-consider Example 3.1. In this example, the interventional question, What
will be my income if I force my age to 32, i.e., P (Income |do(Age = 32)), is
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controversial. In contrast, the interventional question P (Income |σ(Age =
32)) can be interpreted as what will be my income if the company re-
ceives the information that my age is 32, and the counterfactual question
P (Incomeσ(Age=32)|Age = 22, Income = low) can be interpreted as what
would happen to my income if the company had received the information
my age is 32 given that my actual age is 22 and my actual income is low.
4. Info-causal DAG. For a given set of variables X, the causal DAG
is a useful tool to study their causal relationship in the framework of do
intervention. Analogous to the causal DAG, it is natural to study the causal
relationship in X by introducing our info-causal DAG below, under which
the causal semantics could be well defined without any complications in the
framework of info intervention.
Definition 4.1 (Info-causal DAG). Consider a DAG G = (V,E) and a
random vector X with distribution P . Then, G is called an info-causal DAG
for X if P satisfies the following:
1. P factorizes, and thus is Markov, according to G,
2. for any A ⊆ V and any x˜A in the domains of XA,
(4.1) P (x|σ(x˜A)) =
∏
k∈V
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k)),
where x∗k = xk if k /∈ A else x˜k.
In view of (4.1), the difference between the observational distribution
P (x) and the info-intervention distribution P (x|σ(x˜A)) is that the factors
P (xk|xpa(k)) satisfying pa(k) ∩ A 6= ∅ in P (x), are replaced by P (xk|x
∗
pa(k))
in P (x|σ(x˜A)) with xj , j ∈ pa(k) ∩ A, replaced by x˜j , while all remaining
factors P (xk|xpa(k)) satisfying pa(k) ∩ A = ∅ in P (x), are unchanged after
info intervention.
4.1. Info-intervention DAG. For a causal DAG, its do-intervention DAG
could provide possible simple graphical tests to identify the causal (Pearl,
1995). For our info-causal DAG G, its info-intervention DAG can not only
work as the do-intervention DAG, but also provide a visible way to check
the conditions for counterfactual variables. Our info-intervention DAG is
formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Info-intervention DAG). Consider an info-causal DAG
G = (V,E) for a random vector X, and its info intervention σ(x˜A). The
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info-intervention DAG, denoted by Gσ(x˜A), is for Xσ(x˜A), which has the info-
intervention distribution P (x|σ(x˜A)) in (4.1), where X
σ(x˜A) is defined in the
same way as X, except that the variables at descendant nodes of A (say,
Xdesc(A)) are replaced by the counterfactual variables (say, X
σ(x˜A)
desc(A)).
Due to the distinct forms of intervention distribution, our info-intervention
DAG Gσ(x˜A) has three differences from Pearl’s do-intervention DAG Gdo(x˜A).
First, Gσ(x˜A) is for Xσ(x˜A), which is a union of XV/des(A) and X
σ(x˜A)
desc(A). Here,
XV/desc(A) are part of X, and X
σ(x˜A)
desc(A) are counterfactual variables carry-
ing the information XA = x˜A. On the contrary, G
do(x˜A) is still for X. This
difference makes info-intervention σ(x˜A) answer the causal questions of non-
manipulable variables non-controversially and check the conditions related
to counterfactual variables visibly, as demonstrated in Example 3.1 above.
Second, the info-intervention distribution P (x|σ(x˜A)) is different from
the do-intervention distribution P (x|do(x˜A)). The factors P (xk|xpa(k)), k ∈
A, in P (x|σ(x˜A)) inherit from those in P (x), however, they are set to be
degenerate probabilities in P (x|do(x˜A)). This means that the intervention
variables XA are forced to hypothetical values x˜A in G
do(x˜A), while their
joint distribution in Gσ(x˜A) has the same form as that in G. This difference
is compatible to that exhibited in SCM, where the info intervention keeps the
causal mechanisms of endogenous variables, but the do intervention forces
the intervention endogenous variables to hypothetical values (see Example
3.2 above for an illustration).
Third, Gσ(x˜A) and Gdo(x˜A) are graphically different caused by the differ-
ence between P (x|σ(x˜A)) and P (x|do(x˜A)). For simplicity, we assume no
node in A is in desc(A). In this case, the arrows from pa(A) to A are not
removed by σ(x˜A), and this ensures that the probability function of XA
in Gσ(x˜A) has the same form as that in G; however, these arrows are re-
moved by do(x˜A), since do(x˜A) need force XA to hypothetical values x˜A.
Meanwhile, the arrows from A to ch(A) are deleted by σ(x˜A), because the
information XA = x˜A has been received by X
σ(x˜A)
ch(A) ; however, these arrows
are kept by do(x˜A) to capture how XA affect other variables at desc(A)
in Gdo(x˜A). To further illustrate this graphical difference, we consider the
following example:
Example 4.1. A DAG G with four disjoint sets of variables XA, XB,
XC and XD is given in Fig 3(a). Take XA as the intervention variables.
Then, the do-intervention DAG Gdo(x˜A) (see Fig 3(b)) removes the arrows
from pa(A) to A, and forces the intervention variables XA to take the hy-
pothetical values x˜A. On the contrary, the info-intervention DAG G
σ(x˜A)
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(see Fig 3(c)) removes the arrows from A to ch(A), and forces each variable
Xi to be X
σ(x˜A)
i , where the variable X
σ(x˜A)
i is a counterfactual variable if
i ∈ desc(A). In other words, X
σ(x˜A)
D = XD are not counterfactual variables,
X
σ(x˜A)
B and X
σ(x˜A)
C are always counterfactual variables, and the variable
X
σ(x˜A)
i , i ∈ A, is a counterfactual variable if i ∈ desc(A).
XA
XD
XB XC
(a) A DAG G.
XA = x˜A
XD
XB XC
(b) Gdo(x˜A).
X
σ(x˜A)
A
XD
X
σ(x˜A)
B X
σ(x˜A)
C
(c) Gσ(x˜A).
Fig 3: A DAG and its two intervention DAGs.
4.2. Causality as information transfer. Consider two values x˜A 6= x˜
′
A.
In the causal DAG, XA has the causal effect on XB , if P (xB |do(x˜A)) 6=
P (xB |do(x˜
′
A)). In the info-causal DAG, we say that XA has the causal ef-
fect on XB , if P (xB |σ(x˜A)) 6= P (xB |σ(x˜
′
A)). Moreover, we follow Definition
2.5 to say that the causal effect of XA on XB is identifiable if the quantity
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) can be computed uniquely from any positive distribution of
the observed variables that is compatible with G; in this case, many quan-
tities of interest (e.g., the ACE and the conditional ACE) can be calculated
accordingly.
It is worth noting that our viewpoint on causality is essentially differ-
ent from Pearl’s, although the difference in form is just replacing Pearl’s
do operator by our info operator. Our viewpoint of causality focuses on
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) to capture how the information of XA affects the potential out-
come of XB , while Pearl’s focuses on P (xB |do(x˜A)) to capture how the value
of XA affects XB . In other words, we say that XA causes XB iff “changing
information on XA leads to a potential change in XB, while keeping every-
thing else constant”. Based on this ground, we actually view the causality as
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the information transfer in our info intervention framework. Our viewpoint
is different from that in Pearl’s do intervention (or the general intervention-
ist causality) framework, under which XA causes XB iff “changing XA leads
to a change in XB , while keeping everything else constant”.
Besides the close relationship to the interventionist causality, our info in-
tervention framework also builds linkages to “Law-like” causality in physics
and experimental causality in statistics, economics and social sciences. First,
the info intervention keeps the causal mechanisms as in “Law-like” causal-
ity. Second, the info intervention creates the counterfactual variables as in
experimental causality. These two features are not owned by Pearl’s do in-
tervention, and they allow us to use the counterfactual variables to carry the
information on XA and transfer this information by the unchanged struc-
tural equations.
5. Causal calculus for info intervention. The do intervention is a
standard for studying the causality, since it serves (at least) two purposes:
communication and theoretical focus (Pearl, 2009). In the previous sections,
our info intervention has shown its ability as a standard for communicating
about causal questions. In this section, we will show our info intervention can
also be a standard for theoretically focusing on the causal inference. That
is, the theoretical results established for info intervention are applicable to
calculate interventional distributions by using observational distributions,
whenever certain conditions hold in the info-causal DAG. For ease of pre-
sentation, the following abbreviations are used below:
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) := P (X
σ(x˜A)
B = xB) in G
σ(x˜A),
P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC) :=
P (xB , xC |σ(x˜A))
P (xC |σ(x˜A))
.
First, we consider an info-causal DAG, in which a set of adjustment vari-
ables XC satisfy the “back-door” criterion relative to the ordered pair of
variables (XA,XB) (see Fig 4). The “back-door” criterion was first given by
Pearl (1993), and it is equivalent to the ignorability condition of Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). A DAG satisfying “back-door” criterion has been com-
monly used in treatment-outcome applications, and it enables us to identify
the causal effect of XA on XB by adjusting XC .
Theorem 5.1 (“Back-door” criterion). For an info-causal DAG G in
Fig 4,
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) =
∑
xC
P (xB |x˜A, xC)P (xC).
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XA
XC
XB
Fig 4: An info-causal DAG satisfying the “back-door” criterion.
XA XC
XD
XB
Fig 5: An info-causal DAG satisfying the “front-door” criterion.
When the “back-door” criterion holds, Theorem 5.1 shows that the causal
effect of XA on XB is identifiable, since P (xB |σ(x˜A)) (i.e., the probability
of counterfactual variables X
σ(x˜A)
B ) in G
σ(x˜A) can be calculated by using the
observational probabilities P (xB |x˜A, xC) and P (xC) in G.
Second, if no observed variables XC satisfying “back-door” criterion are
found in G, we may use an alternative criterion called “front-door” criterion.
Fig 5 plots an info-causal DAG, in which a set of adjustment variables XC
satisfy the “front-door” criterion relative to the ordered pair of variables
(XA,XB) and some hidden variables XD. The “front-door” criterion for do
intervention was studied by Pearl (1995), and below we show that it can
also be used to identify the causal effect for info-causal DAG.
Theorem 5.2 (“Front-door” criterion). For an info-causal DAG G in
Fig 5,
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) =
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
P (xB |xC , xA)P (xA).
When the “front-door” criterion holds, Theorem 5.2 shows that the causal
effect of XA on XB is identifiable, since P (xB |σ(x˜A)) in G
σ(x˜A) can be
calculated by using the observational probabilities P (xC |x˜A), P (xB |xC , xA)
and P (xA) in G.
Third, to deal with more complicated DAGs beyond “back-door” and
“front-door” criteria, Pearl (1995) provided 3 rules for do intervention, which
enable us to identify a causal query and turn a causal question into a sta-
tistical estimation problem. Specifically, Pearl’s 3 rules describe graphical
criteria for
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1. insertion/deletion of observations,
2. action/observation exchange,
3. insertion/deletion of actions.
By using these three rules, the expression of do intervention probability may
be reduced step-wisely to an equivalent expression involving only observa-
tional probabilities.
Denote by ⊥ d the d-separation, anc(I) the ancestor nodes of every node
in I, and GI¯ the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows pointing to
nodes in I. Similar to Pearl’s 3 rules for do intervention, we can present our
three rules for info intervention.
Theorem 5.3 (Three rules for info intervention). For an info-causal
DAG G, A,B,C and D are its arbitrary disjoint node sets. Then,
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations)
P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC , xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), xD) if B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A);
Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange)
P (xB |σ(x˜A), σ(x˜C), xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), x˜C , xD) if B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A ,x˜C);
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions)
P (xB |σ(x˜A), σ(x˜C), xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), xD) if B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A)
C/anc(D)
,
where C/anc(D) is the set of C-nodes that are not ancestors of any D-node.
In some applications, we may use the following simpler version of three
rules in Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.4. For an info-causal DAG G, A,B,C and D are its arbi-
trary disjoint node sets. Then,
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations)
P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC , xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), xD) if B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A);
Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange)
P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC) = P (xB |x˜A, xC) if B ⊥ d A|C in G
σ(x˜A);
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions)
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) = P (xB) if there are no causal paths from A to B in G.
In view of Theorems 5.1–5.2, we can see that our formulas on “back-
door”/“front-door” criteria are the same as Pearl’s formulas in Pearl (1995).
This is because the distributions of all non-intervention variables are the
same in both info- and do-intervention DAGs, and the random intervention
variables in info-intervention DAG behave similarly as the deterministic
intervention variables in do-intervention DAG, due to the fact that the in-
tervention variables in info-intervention DAG with only possible converging
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arrows do not cause any other variables. Indeed, by (2.1) and (4.1), it is
straightforward to see that for arbitrary disjoint node sets A,B and C in V ,
P (xB |do(x˜A), xC) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC).(5.1)
The result (5.1) implies that our formulas on three Rules in Theorem 5.3 are
also the same as Pearl’s formulas on three Rules in Pearl (1995). Therefore,
since Pearl’s causal calculus based on do intervention is complete (Huang
and Valtorta, 2012), our causal calculus based on info intervention is also
complete, meaning that if a causal effect P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC) is identifiable, it
can be calculated by using a sequence of Rules 1–3 in Theorem 5.3.
The result (5.1) also indicates that Pearl’s causal calculus and our causal
calculus are exchangeable, but this does not mean the same manipulating
convenience in both frameworks. Theorem 5.5 below shows that our con-
ditions for checking Rules 1–3 in Theorem 5.3 are equivalent to those for
checking Rules 1–3 in Pearl (1995), and they tend to be more convenient for
use since the intervention nodes A are not involved as part of conditioning
set in info-intervention DAG.
Theorem 5.5 (Equivalence of checking conditions). For an info-causal
DAG G, A,B,C and D are its arbitrary disjoint node sets. Then,
(i) B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A) ⇐⇒ B ⊥ d C|A,D in GA;
(ii) B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A ,x˜C) ⇐⇒ B ⊥ d C|A,D in G
σ(x˜C )
A
;
(iii) B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A)
C/anc(D)
⇐⇒ B ⊥ d C|A,D in GA,C/anc(D).
Denote XA ⊥ XB |XC by the conditional independence of XA and XB ,
given XC . To end this section, we re-visit an example in Richardson and
Robins (2013).
XA1 XC
XA2XD
XB
(a) A DAG G.
XA1 X
σ(x˜A1 )
C
X
σ(x˜A1 )
A2
XD
X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2 )
B
(b) Gσ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2).
Fig 6: A DAG G and its info-intervention DAG.
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Example 5.1. Consider a DAG G in Fig 6(a), where i 6∈ desc(A1) for
any i ∈ A1, and i 6∈ desc(A2) for any i ∈ A2. Fig 6(b) plots the info-
intervention DAG Gσ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2), where we have used the fact
X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)
A1
=
(
X
σ(x˜A1 )
A1
)σ(x˜A2 ) = (XA1)σ(x˜A2 ) = XA1 ,
X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)
A2
=
(
X
σ(x˜A2 )
A2
)σ(x˜A1 ) = Xσ(x˜A1 )A2 ,
X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)
C =
(
X
σ(x˜A1 )
C
)σ(x˜A2 ) = Xσ(x˜A1 )C , Xσ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)D = XD.
Then, X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)
B ⊥ X
σ(x˜A1 )
A2
|XA1 ,X
σ(x˜A1 )
C , since B ⊥ d A2|A1, C in Fig 6(b).
Note that this conclusion was also proved in Richardson and Robins (2013)
by constructing a single-world intervention graph (SWIG).
Besides the checking of independence between counterfactual variables, we
can also calculate P (xB |σ(x˜A1 , x˜A2), xC) (i.e., the conditional probability of
counterfactual variables X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2)
B given X
σ(x˜A1 ,x˜A2 )
C ) by
P (xB |σ(x˜A1 , x˜A2), xC)
= P (xB |σ(x˜A1), x˜A2 , xC) (by Rule 2 in Theorem 5.3)
= P (xB |x˜A2 , xC) (by Rule 3 in Theorem 5.3).
Note that Richardson and Robins (2013) assumed the modularity condition
P (xB |σ(x˜A1 , x˜A2), xC) = P (xB |x˜A1 , x˜A2 , xC)
to facilitate the causal calculus in SWIG. This modularity condition, which
links the counterfactual probability to the observational probability, is not
needed in our info intervention framework.
6. Extension to generalized info intervention. In our info inter-
vention framework, the intervention variables with no output edges in the
info-intervention graph, have no further causal effects on other variables
in the graph. In some applications, this phenomenon may not be desirable
in terms of communication and theoretical focus. To tackle this problem,
we extend our info intervention to the generalized info intervention in this
section, and this extension seems challenging for the do intervention.
6.1. Generalized info intervention. Consider an SCMM = (G+,X , P, f)
forXV . For j, k ∈ V , define an information function σjk : Xj → Xj to capture
the transferred information on Xj from node j to node k. For example,
we have σjk(Xj) = x˜j for k ∈ ch(j) in the info intervention framework,
meaning that all the child nodes of j have received the information Xj = x˜j .
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Therefore, by choosing different formulas of σjk, we can send out different
information on Xj from node j to node k, leading to different types of
information intervention.
As the information intervention is uniquely determined by the informa-
tion function σjk, we can collect several information functions to form an
information set
σ(F ) :=
{
σjk : (j, k) ∈ F ⊆ V
2
}
,(6.1)
where F is the information index set. We call σ(F ) the generalized info
intervention operator, since it includes different information interventions in
the graph. Below, we show how σ(F ) manipulates in the SCM.
Definition 6.1 (Generalized info intervention). Given an SCM M =
(G+,X , P, f) for XV , the generalized info intervention σ(F ) in (6.1) maps
M to the generalized info-intervention model Mσ(F ) = (G+,X , P, f) for
X
σ(F )
V , where
Xσ(F )v = fv(X˜V ∩pa(v),XU∩pa(v))
with X˜V ∩pa(v) := {X˜jv}j∈pa(v) such that X˜jv = σjv(Xj) if (j, v) ∈ F else
X
σ(F )
j .
Based on Definition 6.1, we can first show that for two disjoint informa-
tion index sets F1 and F2, X
σ(F1,F2)
v :=
(
X
σ(F1)
v
)σ(F2) has the commutative
property, that is, X
σ(F1,F2)
v = X
σ(F2,F1)
v for all v ∈ V .
Second, we know that Mσ(F ) does not delete any structural equations
fV from the model, but just sends out the information Xj is replaced by
X˜jk to the node k if (j, k) ∈ F , and the variable at node k becomes a
counterfactual variable with a hypothetical input Xj = X˜jk in its structural
equation. When σjk(·) is a constant function (as in the info intervention),
the value of Xj is completely known to the node k after intervention, and
hence the edge from j to k (denoted by j → k) is removed in Mσ(F ). When
σjk(·) is not a constant function, the value of Xj is still unknown to the
node k after intervention, and the edge j → k is replaced by the information
edge (denoted by j
σjk
→ k) to transfer the information Xj is replaced by X˜jk
in Mσ(F ). In both cases, the information is further transferred to desc(k),
making the variables at desc(k) become the counterfactual variables.
Third, it is interesting to see that the generalized info intervention nests
several information interventions as its special cases:
1. Info intervention
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• Information function: σjk(Xj) = x˜j for j ∈ J and k ∈ ch(J).
• Transferred information: All the child nodes of J receive the in-
formation Xj is replaced by x˜j .
• Intervention graph: All output edges of nodes J are deleted.
2. Precision Info intervention
• Information function: σjk(Xj) = x˜j for j ∈ J and k ∈ K ⊆ ch(J).
• Transferred information: Only the nodes K receive the informa-
tion Xj is replaced by x˜j .
• Intervention graph: All output edges from nodes J to nodes K
are deleted.
3. Shift Info intervention
• Information function: σjk(Xj) = Xj + s˜j for j ∈ J and k ∈ K ⊆
ch(J).
• Transferred information: Only the nodes K receive the informa-
tion Xj is replaced by Xj + s˜j.
• Intervention graph: Each edge j → k is replaced by j
σjk
→ k.
4. Transform Info intervention
• Information function: σjk(Xj) = gjk(Xj) for j ∈ J , k ∈ K ⊆
ch(J), and a given function gjk(·).
• Transferred information: Each node k receives the information
Xj is replaced by gjk(Xj).
• Intervention graph: Each edge j → k is replaced by j
σjk
→ k if
gjk(·) is not a constant function, else it is deleted.
Clearly, the transform info intervention in Case 4 nests other interventions
in Cases 1-3, and all interventions above could be used together. To further
illustrate how to manipulate σ(F ), we consider the following example:
Example 6.1. Consider an SCM M with three univariate endogenous
variables T , Z and Y , and three latent variables ǫT , ǫZ and ǫY in Fig 7(a).
The structural equations for T , Z and Y are given by
T = fT (ǫT ),
Z = fZ(T, ǫZ),
Y = fY (T,Z, ǫY ).
For this SCM, we consider two generalized info interventions σ(F1) and
σ(F1, F2), where F1 = {σTZ} and F2 = {σTY } with σTZ(T ) = T + s˜ and
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σTY (T ) = t˜. Based on Definition 6.1, the generalized info-intervention SCM
Mσ(F1) given in Fig 7(b) has the following structural equations:
T = fT (ǫT ),
Zσ(F1) = fZ(T + s˜, ǫZ),
Y σ(F1) = fY (T,Z
σ(F1), ǫY ),
where we have used the fact that T σ(F1) = T . Next, the generalized info-
intervention SCM Mσ(F1,F2) given in Fig 7(c) has the following structural
equations: 
T = fT (ǫT ),
Zσ(F1) = fZ(T + s˜, ǫZ),
Y σ(F1,F2) = fY (t˜, Z
σ(F1), ǫY ),
where we have used the fact that T σ(F1,F2) = T and Zσ(F1,F2) = Zσ(F1). Note
that the causal mechanisms (i.e., fZ , fT and fY ) are unchanged in M
σ(F1)
and Mσ(F1,F2), while Z and Y in M become the counterfactual variables
Zσ(F1) and Y σ(F1,F2) in Mσ(F1,F2), respectively. Moreover, from Fig 7(c), the
d-separation argument implies that given Zσ(F1), T and Y σ(F1,F2) are inde-
pendent.
T
Z Y
ǫT
ǫZ ǫY
(a) An SCM M .
T
Zσ(F1) Y σ(F1)
ǫT
ǫZ ǫY
σTZ
(b) Mσ(F1).
T
Zσ(F1) Y σ(F1,F2)
ǫT
ǫZ ǫY
σTZ
(c) Mσ(F1,F2).
Fig 7: An SCM and its two generalized info-intervention SCMs.
In terms of communication, the generalized info intervention allows us
to answer more complicated causal questions than the info intervention.
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For example, we could use the precision info intervention to study how the
intervention variables affect other variables, apply the shift info intervention
to answer the counterfactual question: What if the public had received the
information the price of certain brand increases (or decreases) by 1 dollar?
or manipulate the transform info intervention to answer the counterfactual
question: What if the public had received the information the price of certain
brand increases (or decreases) by 10%?
6.2. Generalized info-causal DAG. Analogous to the info-causal DAG in
Definition 4.1, we can define the generalized info-causal DAG in the gener-
alized information intervention framework.
Definition 6.2 (Generalized info-causal DAG). Consider a DAG G =
(V,E) and a random vector X with distribution P . Then, G is called a
generalized info-causal DAG for X if P satisfies the following:
1. P factorizes, and thus is Markov, according to G,
2. for any F ⊆ V 2 and any ejk := σjk(xj) in the domain of Xj ,
(6.2) P (x|σ(F )) =
∏
k∈V
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k)),
where x∗pa(k) := {x
∗
jk}j∈pa(k) such that x
∗
jk = xj if (j, k) /∈ F else ejk.
Comparing (4.1) with (6.2), the only difference is that P (xk|x
∗
pa(k)) re-
places x∗jk ∈ x
∗
pa(k) with (j, k) ∈ F , by x˜j in the info-causal DAG, while this
x∗jk is replaced by ejk in the generalized info-causal DAG.
Next, similar to the info-intervention DAG in Definition 4.2, we can define
the generalized info-intervention DAG as follows:
Definition 6.3 (Generalized info-intervention DAG). Consider a gen-
eralized info-causal DAG G = (V,E) for a random vector X, and its gener-
alized info intervention σ(F ). Denote a node set AF = {i : (i, j) ∈ F}. The
generalized info-intervention DAG, denoted by Gσ(F ), is for Xσ(F ), which
has the generalized info-intervention distribution P (x|σ(F )) in (6.2), where
Xσ(F ) is defined in the same way as X, except that the variables at de-
scendant nodes of AF (say, Xdesc(AF )) are replaced by the counterfactual
variables (say, X
σ(F )
desc(AF )
).
For (j, k) ∈ F , we know that ejk in G
σ(F ) still depends on xj unless σjk(·)
is a constant function. Therefore, when σjk(·) is not a constant function, the
edge j → k can not be deleted as in the info-intervention DAG, but need be
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replaced by the information edge j
σjk
→ k to process the information transfer
in Gσ(F ). To see this difference clearly, Fig 8(a)-(b) plot two generalized
info-intervention DAGs Gσ(F1) and Gσ(F2) for the DAG G satisfying “front-
door” criterion in Fig 5. In Gσ(F1), since the information function σAC(·) is
a constant function, the edge A → C is deleted. On the contrary, the edge
A → C is replaced by the information edge A
σAC→ C in Gσ(F2), since the
related information function σAC(·) is not a constant function.
XD
X
σ(F1)
A X
σ(F1)
BX
σ(F1)
C
(a) Gσ(F1).
XD
X
σ(F2)
A X
σ(F2)
BX
σ(F2)
C
σAC
(b) Gσ(F2).
D
A
NDA
BCNAC NCB
NDB
(c) G¯σ(F1)
D
A
NDA
BCNAC NCB
NDB
(d) G¯σ(F2)
Fig 8: Two generalized info-intervention DAGs for the DAG in Fig 5, and
their related augmented DAGs. For Gσ(F1), F1 = {σAC} and σAC(XA) = x˜A
(i.e., σAC(·) is a constant function). For G
σ(F2), F2 = {σAC} and σAC(·) is
not a constant function.
As before, we can similarly define the causal effect of XA on XB and
the causal identifiability in the generalized info-causal DAG, and the details
are omitted for saving space. For the theoretical focus, the generalized info-
causal DAG can still have Rules 1 and 3 for causal calculus. To justify the
validity of Rules 1 and 3, we need check the d-separation conditions in the
augmented DAG and its generalized intervention DAG.
Definition 6.4 (Augmented DAG & Intervention augmented DAG).
Consider a DAG G = (V,E) and a generalized info intervention σ(F ). Then,
its augmented DAG is G¯ = (V¯ , E¯), where G¯ is constructed by inserting a
new node Nij in every edge i→ j in G. Moreover, the generalized interven-
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tion augmented DAG for σ(F ) is G¯σ(F ) = (V¯ σ(F ), E¯σ(F )), where V¯ σ(F ) = V¯
and E¯σ(F ) = E¯/EF with
EF = {the edge i→ Nij : (i, j) ∈ F and σij(·) = a constant}.
Here, Nij ∈ V¯ is called the information node.
By Definition 6.4, the augmented DAG G¯σ(F ) essentially plugs in a new
information node Nij between node i and node j in G, and the edge i→ Nij
exists only when σij(·) is not a constant function. To see this point clearly,
we plot two augmented DAGs G¯σ(F1) and G¯σ(F2) in Fig 8(c)-(d), from which
we can see that four new nodes NAC , NCB , NDA and NDB are added into
the graph, and the edge A→ NAC is deleted in G¯
σ(F1).
We are now ready to give Rules 1 and 3 in the generalized info intervention
framework.
Theorem 6.1. For a generalized info-causal DAG G = (V,E), B, C
and D are its arbitrary disjoint node sets. Consider two generalized info
interventions σ(F1) and σ(F2) such that NF1 ∩NF2 = ∅. Then,
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations)
P (xB |σ(F1), xC , xD) = P (xB |σ(F1), xD) if B ⊥ d C|D in G¯
σ(F1);
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions)
P (xB |σ(F1), σ(F2), xD) = P (xB |σ(F1), xD) if B ⊥ d NF2 |D in G¯
σ(F1)
NF2/anc(D)
.
The proofs of Theorem 6.1 are omitted, since they are similar to those of
Theorem 5.3. Theorem 6.1 shows that we only need check the d-separation
condition in the augmented DAG to use Rules 1 and 3. As an application,
we use Rule 3 in this theorem to identify the causal effect under “front-door”
criterion.
Example 6.2. Consider a generalized info-causal DAG G in Fig 5, and
let σ(F ) be its generalized info intervention, where F = {σAC} and σAC(XA)
= gAC(XA) for a given function gAC(·). In this case, we have
P (xB |σ(F )) =
∑
xC
∑
xA
P (xB |xC , xA, σ(F ))P (xC , xA|σ(F ))
=
∑
xC
∑
xA
P (xB |xC , xA)P (xC , xA|σ(F )),
where the last equality holds by Rule 3 in Theorem 6.1, since B ⊥ d NAC |A,C
in G¯. Moreover, by (6.2) we have
P (xC , xA|σ(F )) =
∑
xB
∑
xD
P (xA|xD)P (xB |xC , xD)P (xC |eAC)P (xD)
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= P (xC |eAC)
∑
xD
P (xA|xD)P (xD)
∑
xB
P (xB |xC , xD)
= P (xC |eAC)P (xA),
where eAC = gAC(xA). Hence, it follows that
P (xB |σ(F )) =
∑
xC
∑
xA
P (xC |eAC)P (xB |xC , xA)P (xA).
7. Concluding remarks. This paper proposed a new info intervention
framework to formulate causal questions and implement causal inferences in
graphic models, including SCM and DAG. In the info intervention frame-
work, the causality is viewed as information transfer, meaning that X causes
Y iff changing information onX leads to a potential change in Y , while keep-
ing everything else constant. This new viewpoint allows us to do intervention
by changing the information on X to its descendants, making the counter-
factual descendant variables of X transfer this information, while keeping
the causal mechanisms of the model unchanged. Consequently, our infor-
mation transfer causality shares the features with interventionist causality,
“Law-like” causality as well as experimental causality.
In terms of communication, the info intervention framework makes the
causal questions on non-manipulable variables non-controversially, and al-
lows us to check the conditions related to counterfactual variables visibly. In
terms of theoretical focus, the causal calculus based on “back-door”/“front-
door” criteria and three rules is exchangeable with that in Pearl’s do in-
tervention framework, but under even simpler checking conditions. As an
extension, the generalized info intervention framework was studies to tackle
more complicated causal questions, and this extension seems hard in the
do intervention framework. Therefore, it is hoped that our info intervention
framework, as a standard for studying the causality, could be beneficial to
formalize, process and understand causal relationships in practice.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
To facilitate our proofs, we give a technical lemma which is analogous to
the consistency assumption in the potential outcome framework (Vander-
Weele, 2009).
Lemma A.1. For an info-causal DAG G, A,B and C are its arbitrary
disjoint node sets. Then,
(i) P (x|σ(xA)) = P (x);
(ii) P (xA, xB |σ(xA)) = P (xA, xB);
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(iii) P (xB |xA, σ(xA)) = P (xB |xA);
(iv) P (xA, xB |σ(xA), σ(xC)) = P (xA, xB |σ(xC));
(v) P (xB |xA, σ(xA), σ(xC)) = P (xB |xA, σ(xC)).
Proof of Lemma A.1. The result (i) holds by taking x˜A = xA in (4.1).
By (i) and the marginalization over xA ∪ xB and xA, it follows that
P (xA, xB |σ(xA)) = P (xA, xB) and P (xA|σ(xA)) = P (xA),
which entail the results (ii)–(iii). By (i), we know that P (x|σ(xA), σ(xC)) =
P (x|σ(xC )) = P (x), which entails the result (iv) by the marginalization over
xA ∪ xB . Finally, the result (v) holds by (iv) and a similar argument as for
(iii). This completes all of the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By (4.1), we have
P (xB , xA, xC |σ(x˜A)) = P (xB |x˜A, xC)P (xA|xC)P (xC),
which entails
P (xB |σ(x˜A)) =
∑
xC
∑
xA
P (xB, xA, xC |σ(x˜A))
=
∑
xC
∑
xA
P (xB|x˜A, xC)P (xA|xC)P (xC)
=
∑
xC
P (xB |x˜A, xC)P (xC)
∑
xA
P (xA|xC)
=
∑
xC
P (xB |x˜A, xC)P (xC).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. By (4.1), we have
P (xB , xC , xA, xD|σ(x˜A)) = P (xB |xD, xC)P (xC |x˜A)P (xA|xD)P (xD).
Moreover, it is easy to see that C ⊥ d D|A and A ⊥ d B|C,D in Fig 5. In G,
since the d-separation implies the conditional independence (Geiger, Verma
and Pearl, 1990), we know that XC and XD are independent given XA, and
XA and XB are independent given XC and XD. Hence,
(A.1) P (xC |xD, xA) = P (xC |xA) and P (xB |xD, xC) = P (xB |xD, xC , xA),
where the first equality further implies
(A.2) P (xD|xC , xA) = P (xD|xA).
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Then, it follows that
P (xB |σ(x˜A))
=
∑
xC
∑
xA
∑
xD
P (xB , xC , xA, xD|σ(x˜A))
=
∑
xC
∑
xA
∑
xD
P (xB |xD, xC)P (xC |x˜A)P (xA|xD)P (xD)
=
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
∑
xD
P (xB |xD, xC)P (xA|xD)P (xD)
=
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
∑
xD
P (xB |xD, xC , xA)P (xD|xA)P (xA) by (A.1)
=
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
P (xA)
∑
xD
P (xB |xD, xC , xA)P (xD|xA)
=
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
P (xA)
∑
xD
P (xB |xD, xC , xA)P (xD|xC , xA) by (A.2)
=
∑
xC
P (xC |x˜A)
∑
xA
P (xA)P (xB |xC , xA).
This completes the proof.
To prove Theorem 5.3, we first prove Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. In Gσ(x˜A), since P (xA, xB , xC , xD|σ(x˜A)) fac-
torizes, the d-separation implies the conditional independence (Geiger, Verma
and Pearl, 1990).
For Rule 1, we know thatXB andXC are independent givenXD in G
σ(x˜A),
and hence the conclusion holds.
For Rule 2, since XB and XA are independent given XC in G
σ(x˜A), we
have that P (xB |σ(x˜A), xC) = P (xB |σ(x˜A), x˜A, xC). Then, the conclusion
holds since
P (xB |σ(x˜A), x˜A, xC) =
P (xB, x˜A, xC |σ(x˜A))
P (x˜A, xC |σ(x˜A))
=
P (xB , x˜A, xC)
P (x˜A, xC)
,
where the second equality holds by Lemma A.1(ii).
For Rule 3, let Anc(B) = anc(B) ∪B. Then, by (4.1), we have
P (x|σ(x˜A)) =
∏
k∈V
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k))
=
∏
k∈Anc(B)
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k)) ·
∏
k/∈Anc(B)
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k))
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=
∏
k∈Anc(B)
P (xk|xpa(k)) ·
∏
k/∈Anc(B)
P (xk|x
∗
pa(k)),
where we have used the fact that x∗pa(k) = xpa(k) for any k ∈ Anc(B), since
A ∩Anc(B) = ∅. Marginalizing over xAnc(B), we can obtain
P (xAnc(B)|σ(x˜A)) =
∏
k∈Anc(B)
P (xk|xpa(k)) = P (xAnc(B)).
Since B ∈ Anc(B), the conclusion follows directly. This completes all of the
proofs.
For Theorem 5.3, its Rule 1 has been proved in Theorem 5.4, and its Rules
2 and 3 are proved below.
Proof of Theorem 5.3 (Rule 2). Since XB and XC are independent
givenXD inG
σ(x˜A ,x˜C), we have that P (xB |σ(x˜A, x˜C), xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜A, x˜C),
x˜C , xD). Then, the conclusion holds since
P (xB |σ(x˜A, x˜C), x˜C , xD) =
P (xB , xD|σ(x˜A, x˜C), x˜C)
P (xD|σ(x˜A, x˜C), x˜C)
=
P (xB , xD|σ(x˜A), x˜C)
P (xD|σ(x˜A), x˜C)
,
where the last equality holds by Lemma A.1(v).
To prove Rule 3 in Theorem 5.3, we need an additional lemma.
Lemma A.2. For an info-causal DAG G, B,C1, C2 and D are its arbi-
trary disjoint node sets. Then,
(i) P (xB |σ(x˜C1), σ(x˜C2), xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜C2), xD) if B ⊥ d C1|D in G
σ(x˜C2 );
(ii) P (xB |σ(x˜C2), xD) = P (xB |xD) if there are no causal paths from C2
to B ∪D in G.
Proof of Lemma A.2. First, since B ⊥ d C1|D in G
σ(x˜C2 ), we know
that B ⊥ d C1|D in G
σ(x˜C1 ,x˜C2). Then, the result (i) follows by the fact that
P (xB |σ(x˜C1), σ(x˜C2), xD)
= P (xB |x˜C1 , σ(x˜C2), xD) (by Rule 2 in Theorem 5.3)
= P (xB |σ(x˜C2), xD) (by Rule 1 in Theorem 5.3).
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Second, since there are no causal paths from C2 to B ∪ D, by Rule 3 in
Theorem 5.4 we have
P (xB, xD|σ(x˜C2)) = P (xB , xD) and P (xD|σ(x˜C2)) = P (xD),
which entail that the result (ii) holds. This completes all of the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 5.3 (Rule 3). Let C1 = C ∩ anc(D) and C2 =
C/anc(D). It suffices to show
P (xB |σ(x˜C1), σ(x˜C2), xD) = P (xB |wD), if B ⊥ d C|D in GC2 .(A.3)
First, we prove that if B ⊥ d C|D in GC2 , then
B ⊥ d C1|D in G
σ(x˜C2 ),(A.4)
and hence by Lemma A.2(i) we have
P (xB |σ(x˜C1), σ(x˜C2), xD) = P (xB |σ(x˜C2), xD).(A.5)
Suppose the result (A.4) does not hold. Then, there exists a D-connected
path from B to C1 in G
σ(x˜C2 ). Note that this path can not contain any node
in C2. This is because if this path includes a node c
∗ ∈ C2, then c
∗ 6∈ anc(D)
must be a collider, in view of the fact that the nodes C2 in G
σ(x˜C2 ) have
no output edges. It turns out that this path is blocked by D, leading to a
contradiction. Therefore, since this D-connected path does not contain any
node in C2, it is also in GC2 , leading to a contradiction with the condition
that B ⊥ d C|D in GC2
Second, we prove that if B ⊥ d C|D in GC2 , then
there are no causal paths from C2 to B in G,(A.6)
and hence by Lemma A.2(ii) and the fact that C2 ∩ anc(D) = ∅, we have
P (xB |σ(x˜C2), xD) = P (xB |xD).(A.7)
Suppose the result (A.6) does not hold. Then, there exists a shortest causal
path from C2 to B in G, and this shortest path contains only one node in
C2. Hence, this shortest path is also in GC2 . Since B ⊥ d C|D in GC2 , it
implies that C2 ∩ anc(D) 6= ∅, leading to a contradiction with the fact that
C2 ∩ anc(D) = ∅.
Finally, the conclusion follows by (A.5) and (A.7).
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Proof of Theorem 5.5. We first prove that if B ⊥ d C|A,D in GA,
then
B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A).(A.8)
To prove (A.8), it suffices to show that any path ℓ from B to C in Gσ(x˜A) is
blocked by D. We consider two different cases:
Case I: if the path ℓ contains a node a∗ ∈ A, then a∗ 6∈ anc(D) must be a
collider in Gσ(x˜A), since the nodes A in Gσ(x˜A) have no output edges. Hence,
the path ℓ is blocked by D in Case I.
Case II: if the path ℓ contains no nodes in A, then ℓ is also a path in
GA, and hence it is blocked by A and D in GA, due to the condition that
B ⊥ d C|A,D in GA. In other words, there exists a node κ, which blocks
this path ℓ in GA. If κ is a collider, then κ 6∈ anc(A ∪D) in GA, indicating
that there has no causal path from κ to D in GA. Then, it further implies
that there has no causal path from κ to D in Gσ(x˜A), meaning that the path
ℓ is blocked by D in Gσ(x˜A).
If κ is not a collider, then κ ∈ A ∪ D in GA. Since the path ℓ contains
no nodes in A, it follows that κ ∈ D in Gσ(x˜A), meaning that the path ℓ is
blocked by D in Gσ(x˜A).
Overall, we have shown that no matter whether κ is a collider, the path
ℓ is blocked by D in Case II. Therefore, the result (A.8) holds. Similarly, we
can show that if B ⊥ d C|D in G
σ(x˜A), then B ⊥ d C|A,D in GA. Hence,
the result (i) holds.
Note that the nodes C are chosen arbitrarily in the proof of (i). So, the
results (ii)–(iii) follow by the same argument as for the result (i). This com-
pletes all of the proofs.
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